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LEVINAS SEPARATES THE (HU)MAN FROM 
THE NONHU)MAN, USING HUNGER, 
ENJOYMENT AND ANXIETY TO ILLUMINATE 
THEIR RELATIONSHIP
Angela Hirst
AbstrAct: This paper is part of my journey with Emmanuel Levinas on a dystopic path to 
the ethical encounter. For the journey, I agree to be Levinas’s human subject, to encounter his 
“other”. And he agrees to traverse a path through my world, a world of food and eating. To ready 
me for the encounter, Levinas tells me the story of his ethics, narratively (we ‘journey’ through 
it), and so this paper is unavoidably ‘story’ too. To preface, then: The ethical encounter is a “face 
to face” encounter between a “human” subject (me) and an “other” (Totality and Infinity, 39). In 
my encountering the other face to face in the world of food, food production and eating, Levinas 
tells the story of the violences of my existence- of my ‘eating’ of the world at  the expense of the 
other. Face to face with the other, I cannot void my responsibility for the needs and suffering of 
the other. In “proximity” with the other, I am guilty for eating; in proximity, I respond by giving 
the other “bread from [my] mouth” otherwise than Being, 100). In this first part of the journey, 
I am hungry, and Levinas leads me through scenes replete with food and eating. He shows me 
how this world can satiate my needs, but how it will, inevitably and inextricably, leave me, a not-
yet ethical human subject, vulnerable and exposed.
Keywords: Levinas; hunger; nourishment; enjoyment; anxiety; proximity; ethics; face to face 
encounter; the il y a; elemental; alterity; vision; elevation; bonne conscience; grasping
I wish to begin by asking how and where do I encounter “the other” in an ethical 
manner? This question would be somewhat irrelevant if this “other” were like any other 
thing that I may come across in the world. If the other were any thing, then I would, 
perhaps, encounter the other everywhere. But the other is, according to Levinas, spe-
cifically and exclusively another human.1 It follows that my place in relation to this (hu)
     1. Throughout this paper, when referring to the ethical subject of Levinas’s making, I will be even more 
specific. I plan to continually draw attention to the fact that this other human who I encounter face to face, 
is a ‘(hu)man’. The argument for this is complex and will be drawn out of Levinas’s work by the end of part 
two of this paper. It is complex, but also self-evident in Levinas’s work, if one chooses to look for it. At many 
times, he makes no disguise of it, using the term ‘man’ rather than ‘human’. “It is only man who could be 
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man must somehow differ from my place in relation to nonhumans. According to Levi-
nas, the condition of being (hu)man does place me in a very particular way within the 
world, and this opens my existence to the potential of the ethical encounter. I say only the 
potential of the ethical encounter, rather than the encounter itself, because, at this stage, 
I am not yet guaranteed of the stability of my ethical position or my status. Nonethe-
less, for Levinas, to be a (hu)man is to be transcendent: it is already to take a step up-
ward. But what am I stepping up towards? I am stepping towards an absolute otherness, 
which Levinas calls alterity. And this alterity is only accessible through a (hu)man face. 
Furthermore, I, as one such (hu)man, can only access this alterity by encountering the 
face of another (hu)man. I cannot access it in my own face. The other (hu)man is always 
more transcendent than I. Nonetheless, I am a (hu)man, and this does give me access to 
a certain amount of elevation. I may not be placed as high as the ‘ethical other’, but I 
am certainly higher than the rest of the world. I am a subject that is beyond, or “above 
being,” and with this movement upward, the possibility of ethics opens before me.2 But 
the light of (hu)man alterity is unbearably bright, so at the moment, I do not look in that 
direction. Right now, I am content to use my position, and this light, to illuminate the 
rest of the world. And from up here, the otherness of all other alterity on earth pales in 
comparison to the alterity of (hu)mans. (Hu)man alterity is entirely unknowable, where-
as this world below me is already lit by my perspective on it. This is how Levinas begins 
the story of my relationship with the world. In the following two sections of this paper, 
I describe what I believe to be the hidden assertion and safety mechanism underlying 
Levinas’s descriptions of the subject in the world—that is the fact that, as one such sub-
ject, I will not encounter both the world and its alterity at the same time.
1. A HUNGRY STOMACH wITHOUT EARS
In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the Other, I 
am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone. Not against the Others, not 
‘as for me…’—but entirely deaf  to the Other, outside of  all communication and 
all refusal to communicate—without ears, like a hungry stomach (TI:134).
absolutely foreign to me” (TI:73). we could be lenient on Levinas (or his translator), and assume he means 
human. However, I prefer to be suspicious, and this is why I have chosen to describe Levinas’s human other 
as (hu)man. Sylvia Benso, in her book The Face of  Things (2000: 35-7) says “The woman is Autrui [the Other] 
only as an ef-faced, forgotten other. That is, the woman is not properly Autrui”. Or, even more relevant to 
this discussion: “To be Autrui, the woman should cease being a woman”; hence my justification for using 
(hu)man.
For other examples of theorists who have argued that Levinas’s use of the term ‘man’ exceeds grammatical 
standards of the time, see Luce Irigaray’s “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas” (1991); Helen Chapman’s 
“Levinas and the Concept of the Feminine” (1988); Morny Joy’s “Levinas, Alterity, the Feminine and 
women: A meditation” (1994: 463); Kelly Oliver’s Family Values: Subjects Between Nature and Culture (1997: 
64-5); Craig Vasey’s “Faceless women and Serious Others: Levinas, misogyny and feminism” (1992: 327); 
and Jacques Derrida’s “At This Very Moment In This work Here I Am” (1991: 39-40).
     2. There are many writings by Levinas that deal directly with the transcendent notion of ‘above being’. See 
also: “The Transcendence of words” (1949 (1989)) “Transcendence and Height” (1996), “From the One to 
the Other: Transcendence and Time” (1998), and “Transcendence and Evil” (1978 (1998)). 
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Here, where he describes the isolated ego, Levinas says that I am entirely deaf  to the 
Other. I am like a hungry stomach—that is, I am without ears. Now, the question that I ask is, 
if I am without ears, then what senses am I using to enjoy myself? If I am without ears, 
can I at least touch, taste, smell and see what I eat? Of all my senses, I would miss hear-
ing the least when I eat. But if I could not see and smell what I am about to eat, if I could 
not taste what I am eating or savour its textures and flavours, then surely one or any of 
these losses would result in more disappointment than a soundless meal.
when Levinas says that, in enjoyment, I am a hungry stomach without ears, he is 
referring specifically to my deafness towards the other (hu)man. In Totality and Infinity, he 
refers again to this targeted deafness:
It is an existence for itself—but not, initially, in view of its own existence. Nor is it a 
representation of self by self. It is for itself as in the expression ‘each for himself ’; 
for itself as the ‘famished stomach that has no ears’, capable of killing for a crust 
of bread, is for itself; for itself as the surfeited one who does not understand the 
starving and approaches him as an alien species, as the philanthropist approaches 
the destitute (TI:118).3
Although Levinas has the ethical other in mind when writing about this deafness, 
deafness toward everything seems to be a repercussion, if not a deliberate outcome of 
enjoyment. As I am eating chicken soup, I am certainly deaf towards the starving (hu)
man, but I am also deaf towards the chicken. However, I imagine that Levinas would 
say that there is no need to be deaf towards the chicken, for the chicken is not placing 
any direct ethical demands upon me. It cannot place any demands on me because it has 
no alterity that would open me to my guilt and responsibility. The world, as it is eaten, 
does not face me. Levinas says that I engage with the world, predominantly, as some-
thing that appears to be given over to my needs. In fact, how the world appears to me, is a 
major focus of Levinas’s explorations of (hu)man enjoyment. The world appears because 
I see it. And so, without saying as much, Levinas confirms the deafness that I experience 
toward the rest of the nonhuman world. Instead of hearing, I use sight. In fact, Levinas’s 
descriptions of the privileged position that my visual relationship with the world allows 
me are in direct contrast to my absolute inability to use sight to relate to the other (hu)
man. Levinas completely undermines vision and light in relationship to alterity, but 
not, it seems, in relation to the world.4 I focus in this section on Levinas’s descriptions 
     3. After reading Levinas’s paper “Secularization and Hunger,” it became clear that his reference to the 
“famished stomach that has no ears,” comes from Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel: “So Gaster was created 
earless…. He only speaks by signs” (Rabelais 1944: 652). Gaster is a reference to “Messer Gaster”, which 
translates to ‘Mr Stomach’ (SH: Translator’s fn. 7). ‘Messer’ is also ‘knife’ in German.
     4. There are several theorists who have dealt with Levinas’s description of the sensual relationship between 
the ethical other and the (hu)man subject, but have only brushed over Levinas’s rather traditional reliance on 
light and vision as mechanisms for describing (hu)man cognitive dominance over the world. For examples, 
see wyschogrod’s “Doing Before Hearing: On the primacy of touch” (1980); Cathryn Vasseleu’s Textures of  
Light: Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty (1998); Paul Davies’s “The Face and the Caress: 
Levinas’s ethical alterations of sensibility” (1993); Elizabeth Grosz’s “The ‘People of the Book’: Representa-
tion and alterity in Emmanuel Levinas” (1987). As far as I can tell, there are very few theorists who have 
analysed in detail Levinas’s use of visual metaphors outside of the ethical encounter. Irigaray’s paper, “The 
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of the spatial relationship between the world and the (hu)man subject, as facilitated by 
vision.5
The world appears to me when I am alone and hungry
I return to “In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the 
Other, I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone” (TI:134), and I ask what 
is it to be alone without solitude? For Levinas, this seems to mean that I am separate from 
everything while still being in the world. I am amongst others, but I still hold them at a 
distance. “A being…frees itself from all the weight of the world, from immediate and 
incessant contacts; it is at a distance” (TI:116). As one such being, this means that I have 
managed to wrench myself away from the world.6 I have bundled up my loose ends and 
smoothed my edges so that everything that is with me in this separation soon begins to 
feel like me. My mind and my body are now consistent with what I think of as ‘myself ’. 
I am a totality of myself. I am the same as myself. And as a consequence of this, I also 
realise that the rest of the world is other to me.
But I must qualify this statement: the world is other to me but it is by no means abso-
lutely other to me. I give another example of how Levinas describes my separation from 
the world: “The I in the world has an inside and an outside” (EE:39). The inside of the 
I is what occurs in the mind that makes me think I am a totality. The outside of the I 
is what occurs outside of my mind, which makes my thoughts appear. But the result of 
this inside and outside of the I is that everything seems to be given over to my separation. 
Fecundity of the Caress: A reading of Levinas, Totality and Infinity section IV, B, ‘The Phenomenology of 
Eros’” (1993); Richard Cohen’s “Emmanuel Levinas: Happiness is a sensational time” (1981); and Alphonso 
Lingis’s “The Sensuality and the Sensitivity” (1986), are the only examples I have come across.
     5. In this section, I will undertake a close reading and analysis of Levinas’s descriptions of vision, enjoyment 
and separation, particularly as they occur in “Interiority and Economy,” “Sensibility and the Face,” and 
“Exteriority and Language” in Totality and Infinity (TI:109-80,187-91,295-7); as well as “The world,” in 
Existence and Existents (EE:27-44); Part II of Time and the Other (TO:58-66); and “Intentionality and Sensing” 
in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (OB:23-45).
     6. Ajzenstat (2001: 34) describes this process well: “From this [the throb of undifferentiated being], a 
human being wrenches herself, separating herself as a particular, a consciousness, an autonomous being…. 
Thus, she becomes able to see others as others, or to experience exteriority. But at the same time, and 
before she meets any others, she finds that in separating herself…she becomes her own sameness, which is 
to say, a being who is the same as herself, a being who understands herself to be herself, a being who, qua 
that being, is consistent with herself despite the possible existence of conflicts in the soul”. For a similarly 
vivid description of this separation, see also wyschogrod’s “Derrida, Levinas and Violence” (1989: 184).
An interesting parallel can be drawn in Julia Kristeva’s description of the role abjection plays in the 
creation of an autonomous self. The abject is pre-identity: It precedes the distinction between subject and 
object. (I will describe abjection in more detail in footnote 52 in section two.) Using Kristeva’s work, Oliver 
(1993: fn.10) describes the separation, which I have spoken of in the text, in terms of the subject’s earliest 
relationship to the object. “The prototypical abject experience…is the experience of birth itself. It is at the 
birth of the child, and not before, that the identity of the human subject is most visibly called into question. 
Before the umbilical cord is cut, who can decide whether there is one or two?” (Oliver 1993: 57). According 
to Oliver, “between birth and birth” is also the place that Jean-Francois Lyotard describes as the object of 
our longing. “It is the space between our birth and our realization that we were born, a place forever lost 
to us” (fn.10,p.193).
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The world appears as I think it to be. There is nothing outside of me that cannot also 
occur inside of me, represented by my thoughts. There is nothing in the world that is 
unthinkable.
This correlation between my inside (my mind) and my outside (the world) is made 
possible because of my sense of vision,7 because, according to Levinas and many others, 
there is a very close conceptual link between thinking and vision.8 Hans Jonas (1953: 
152), through a thorough phenomenological explication of the relationship between vi-
sion and thought, demonstrates the way that the mind goes where vision points. I refer 
to his essay, “The Nobility of Sight,” to analyse how and why Levinas aligns thinking 
and vision.
There are several inextricably interwoven characteristics of vision that distinguish 
it from my other senses and help to facilitate my self-consciousness. Firstly, vision al-
lows me to view many things simultaneously.9 In contrast, my other senses construct 
simultaneity in a time-bound, non-spatial way. For instance, using touch I must seek 
out an object in space. Then, to construct a spatial picture of an object using touch, I 
must move my hand around the object. Any sense I gain of its position in space and of 
its form comes over time: As I move my hand over the object’s surface, I gradually build 
up knowledge of what it ‘looks’ like. The same occurs in hearing:
In hearing music, our synthesis of a manifold to a unity of perception refers not to an 
object other than the sensory contents but to their own order and interconnection. 
Since this synthesis deals with succeeding data and is spread over the length of 
their procession, so that at the presence of any one element of the series all the 
others are either no more or not yet, and the present one must disappear for the 
next on to appear, the synthesis itself is a temporal process achieved with the help 
of memory (Jonas 1953: 138).
In both hearing and touch, the knowledge base that I am gradually building can 
be torn down instantly. As I feel my way around a wall in darkness, I may think that 
     7. Vasseleu (1998: 78) says that for Levinas, “light is the sensuous element within which consciousness finds 
and sustains itself, and makes itself a home. Light is ‘first experience’, or the condition of the apprehensibility 
of sensibility”.
     8. Thinking is often described in metaphors derived largely from the visual realm. One early visual 
metaphor can be found in Plato’s The Republic. In his analogy of the cave, Plato maps the path of ‘knowers’ as 
they leave a world of “darkness and illusory shadows to a world of light and objects genuinely seen” (Heldke 
1992: 205). Aristotle, in the first lines of Metaphysics, relates the desire for knowledge to sight: “All men by 
nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their 
usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all the sense of sight. we prefer sight to almost everything 
else. The reason for this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between 
things” (Aristotle 1924). Descartes also uses visual metaphors, to, as Lisa Heldke (1992: 205) describes it: 
“…shin[e] the ‘light of reason’ upon each of the objects of his consciousness, to determine whether they 
can be seen/known ‘clearly and distinctly’”. And Edmund Husserl’s (1982: 151) phenomenology explicates 
a perceptual understanding reliant on a “circle of light”. what lies just beyond this circle is just beyond our 
intentional regard, so through intentional focus, this darkness can be converted into light. 
     9. “Sight is par excellence the sense of the simultaneous…. An opening of the eyes, discloses a world of co-
present qualities spread out in space, ranged in depth, continuing into indefinite distance…” (Jonas 1953: 
136).
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I am inside a room, when suddenly, as one corner turns in the wrong direction under 
my hand, I realise that I am in fact outside. Or someone may be telling me a story that 
I think I have heard before, until they change the way the story ends. On the other 
hand, as soon as I open my eyes, the world is spread out before me. Jonas calls this 
“the copresence of things”.10 The scene that I see now is the same scene that was there 
before I opened my eyes; and unless things begin to move, it is the same scene that will 
continue to exist into the future. Over time, I may pick up more detail, but this is detail 
that was already there in the scene. In touch and in hearing there is a gradual building 
of knowledge, but in any one instant I never gain the whole picture. A whole seascape 
may surround me, but if my eyes are closed, I may only know that a cool breeze brushes 
my face, or that waves crash onto rocks far below my feet.
But how does this co-presence of things available to me through vision invoke 
thought? The key to understanding this causal relationship is to remember the way that 
simultaneity seems to substantiate sameness.11 The transience of every moment that I 
may experience in touch and hearing is replaced with a certainty of my surroundings 
across time. And basically, this consistency gives me time to think: It gives me time to 
think clearly, so that I can begin to know certain things. I ask a question, such as the one 
Levinas poses when trying to ascertain the structure of thinking: “what shows itself in 
truth?” (OB:27). Levinas could just as easily be saying (with vision as his aid), “what 
appears to me?”. Because of the complicity between vision and thinking, we can take 
the two questions to mean the same thing. In looking at a scene, what appears to me is 
the truth. And because there is some consistency to this scene, I have time to compare 
what lies before my eyes.
This possibility is supported by two other characteristics of sight. Firstly, I am al-
ways at a distance from what I am looking at: “Our presence in the world is across a 
distance…we are separated from objects by a distance, which can indeed be traversed, 
but remains a distance” (EE:39). Secondly, because of this distance, I need not engage in 
any way with the scene before me in order to see it. without needing to engage with the 
scene, I not only have time to think, but I also have time to think about the interrelation 
and proportion of things to each other and myself. So not only is my vision the precipi-
tate for my cognitive processes, it is also the reason I can think objectively.12 One way to 
imagine this objective perspective that I can have in relation to the world is that I see the 
world as if a pane of glass sits between the world and myself, preventing any physical 
contact.13 And light is coming from my side of the glass, so the things on the other side of 
     10. “Only the simultaneous representation of the visual field gives us coexistence as such, i.e., the copresence 
of things in one being which embraces them all as their common present” (Jonas 1953: 144).
     11. Steven Smith (1986: 77) describes this sameness across time as a “re-presentation,” or “a return to 
presence”: “The rationality of being stems from their presence and adequation. The operations of knowledge 
re-establish rationality behind the diachrony of becoming in which presence occurs or is foreseen. Knowledge 
is a re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may remain other to it”.
     12. “Thus,” Jonas states, “objectivity emerges pre-eminently from sight” (1953: 144).
     13. This description of the objectivity maintained by the (hu)man subject separated from the rest of the 
world is inspired by Heldke’s (1992: 205) metaphor of the glass wall which she uses to explain the control 
humans like to exercise over the world: “Subjects stand on one side of the wall, objects on the other. The 
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the glass cannot even see me. I can make judgements about what occurs on their side of 
the glass free from the worry that I may be having an effect on these events.
Yet my other senses are always in the process of making the world appear to me, 
and therefore, when I use them I undertake a less detached engagement with the world. 
Take touch: when I touch, the object touches me as much as I touch it.14 In hearing, 
the object comes to me: I can only be a passive recipient of what the object does. Using 
either of these senses, I cannot maintain the active separation nor the autonomy that it 
would take for objectivity to be an outcome of my relationship with the world.
There is yet another repercussion of my visual relationship with the world. Because 
everything is already set out before me when I open my eyes, and my distance from the 
scene ensures that I need not interact with what I am viewing: I have the freedom to 
choose what I focus on. what I choose to focus on can be handed over, objectively, to my 
mind, as a thought. And as an abstraction or representation, the object of my intention 
takes on a new life.
The image is handed over to imagination, which can deal with it in complete 
detachment from the actual presence of the original object: this detachability of 
the image, i.e., of “form” from its “matter,” of “essence” from “existence,” is at the 
bottom of abstraction and therefore of all free thought” (Jonas 1953: 147).
In Jonas’s description, what occurs when I see the world is an intentional choosing. 
There is no scope for anything that I cannot fix within my sight to become thought. 
This suggests that the intimate connections Levinas makes between thinking and vision 
are forged by a ‘freedom of choice’ that never chooses the invisible. I choose to remove 
alterity from the world: I never choose to see it—I always choose what I can see. Thus 
alterity is invisible to me.
Levinas describes this generation of truth through knowledge as the intentionality 
wall prevents any actual physical contact between subject and object, but, being glass, it allows subjects to 
make all ‘necessary’ observations of the objects. Controls are concealed on the subjects side of the wall; it 
is they who set up the conditions of observation, determine the questions which will be posed, and decide 
what counts as an answer to them. Although objects may surprise subjects—with unexpected answers, or 
with a refusal to provide answers—it is the subjects who set the terms of interchange. Thus, on the subject/
object model for inquiry, not only are subjects separated from objects, but they also exercise autonomy and 
control over the objects of their inquiry. Objects, on the other hand, have comparatively little autonomy or 
control over subjects”.
Perhaps it is the architect in me that prefers to think about the relationship of sight and knowledge as 
viewing the world through a plane of glass rather than the way many philosophers seem to think about the 
relationship between sight and knowledge as the positioning of objects in relation to a horizon. Michael 
Purcell explains the use of a horizon of understanding in relation to Levinas’s work in “The Ethical 
Significance of Illeity (Emmanuel Levinas)” (1996: 126-7). The plane of glass is, in fact, describing the world 
through a horizon line. This is how architects draw perspectival drawings: The horizon line sits at the same 
height as the viewer’s eyes, with all objects located on this transparent plane and their edges ‘vanishing’ to 
the horizon line.
     14. “The obtaining of the touch-experience itself is nothing but the entering into actual intercourse with 
the object: i.e., the very coming into play of this sense already changes the situation obtaining between me 
and the object. …Subject and object are already doing something to each other in the very act in which the 
object becomes a phenomenal presence” (Jonas 1953: 145).
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of “bonne conscience” (EFP:82).15 It is as if light streams out of me, like the messengers of 
my bonne conscience, illuminating the world with my intentions to know it. with vision as 
my aid, I can build knowledge with more certainty than I can with hearing or touch, or 
any other sense. I need not explore all the surfaces of a rock to know its form. I give this 
rock its form through my perspective on it:
Things have a form, are seen in the light—silhouettes or profiles…. As silhouette 
and profile a thing owes its nature to a perspective, remains relative to a point of 
view; a thing’s situation thus constitutes its being (TI:140).16
In appearing at all, the world seems to belong to my knowledge. “Objects appear 
as this or that; to be perceived is already to be perceived as something” (wyschogrod 
1980: 181). More than this even, the material of the world is only given definition, only 
becomes lucid in the light of my bonne conscience. Thus, the illuminated world seems des-
tined for me. Levinas says as much:
In existing, an object exists for someone, is destined for someone, already leans 
     15. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas undertakes a complex description of the structure of cognition. He 
contends that in order to think I must get out of phase with myself. That is, I must ask myself a question 
about a situation that I am already in. “Are you hungry Angela?”, I say to myself. “Yes, I think I am,” 
I answer. In the time it takes for me to ascertain this information, I have come momentarily unstuck. 
wyschogrod (1980: 180) : “In this passing of time, the being of the subject who knows stakes itself for an 
instant only to recover itself ”. If only for an instant, I have come unstuck from my own being in order to 
question that same being. This, the “getting out of phase of the instant” Levinas says, is how “thought is 
awakened in being” (OB:28-9). I have moved from a position of being hungry, to a position of knowing 
that I am hungry. But in moving into this position, time has also moved on, and I am no longer present 
in that previous moment. Yet still, it is true—I know that I am hungry. I am hungry, but in order to know 
that I am hungry, I have had to interrogate myself, and in this instant lost through my interrogation, I gain 
thought. In fact, it is more accurate to say that thought has occurred through a process of recollection, 
or “a recuperation in which nothing is lost,” from one instant in my being to the next (OB:28). what I 
‘have been’ is lost to me, in the moment of questioning myself, but is then re-established in the moment 
of answering myself. I have gained knowledge of what I already knew in some other way. In other words, 
my thought, which has arisen between the moment of asking myself the question, “are you hungry?” 
and the moment of my answering, “yes,” comes as a substantiation of what is already given. In his paper, 
“Nonintentional Consciousness,” Levinas says: “The exteriority or otherness of the self is recaptured in 
immanence. what thought knows or what it learns in its experience is both the other and thought’s self. 
One learns only what one already knows and what can be put into the interiority of thought in the guise 
of recallable, re-presentable memory” (NC:125). wyschogrod (1980: 180) describes this “recuperation” 
in terms of “fore-understanding”. “Fore-understanding lurks in the structure of intentionality itself, that 
which is fore-understood is lost and recovered by consciousness as a fulfilment of fore-understanding. And 
Levinas again: “The great principle on which everything depends: The thought [le pensé]—object, theme, 
meaning—refers back to the thought [la pensée] that thinks it, but also determines the subjective articulation 
of its appearing: being determines its phenomena” (NC:123). According to wyschogrod (1980: 180), even if 
my expectations had remained unfulfilled—that is, I realise, in answering my own interrogation that in fact 
I am not hungry—I “attribute falsity” to my fore-understanding rather than throw into doubt this ‘getting 
out of phase with the instant.’ Even if I realise that I am not hungry, I have still come unstuck and then 
recuperated my being in order to think.
     16. “Form is that by which a being is turned toward the sun, that by which it has a face, through which it 
gives itself, by which it comes forward” (EE:31).
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toward an inwardness and, without being absorbed in it, gives itself (EE:40).17
Myself and the world are still separated. The world is still outside of me, but it now 
appears that the world is defined by what is inside of me. As Levinas says, “thought is 
always clarity or the dawning of a light” (EE:41). Light is the mechanism that allows 
my interior—my self—to envelop the exterior world without removing our separation. 
Perhaps this is why, then, when I am hungry—when I think that I am hungry— “the 
world offers the bountifulness of terrestrial nourishment to [my] intentions…” (EE:30). 
we remain separate, this world and I, yet it relinquishes its autonomy, as if it never had 
any autonomy, as if it were always mine. we are in relation, but this relation is not an 
encounter with any ethical resonance. It is a relationship in which what appears—that is, 
what is the same as me—predetermines the other.
within the work of intentionality, the same is in relation with the other but in 
such a way that the other does not determine the same; it is always the same that 
determines the other (TI:124).
This ability I have to determine the other is what elevates me. I am eminent. My 
separation from the world can be understood as “an exaltation, an ‘above being’” 
(TI:119). And with this privilege, I am also taken a step closer (a step ‘upwards’) toward 
the possibility of an ethical encounter. Levinas asserts the importance of this step upward: 
“The I is thus the mode in which the break-up of totality, which leads to the presence 
of the absolutely other, is concretely accomplished” (TI:117-8). In order for the face to face 
encounter to be ethical, my totality—my separate, intentional existence—must break 
up. But, paradoxically, in order to meet face to face with the Other, I must first and 
foremost consider myself to be a totality. I cannot yet hear the call of the ethical other. 
I am without ears. what is not clear is how I can maintain this position long enough to 
encounter the other (hu)man ethically. So again, I look away from the face of the Other 
and turn my attention back to the world.
I am separate from the world, and the first repercussion of this separateness is that 
I am very, very hungry. As a finite being, I have always a limited amount of resources 
stored in my body to burn in order to live. I am a hungry stomach without ears. Ears 
alone do not help me find the food that I need. I am hungry, and I know that I am 
hungry, because I can see and I can think and I do this separately and in an elevated 
position in relation to the world. This allows me to see that below me there are many, 
many things for me to eat. But my elevated separateness also opens me to a slightly 
more precarious predicament. In a sense, I am like my vision: I am ‘noble’ just as vi-
sion, according to Jonas, is ‘noble’. And it is this nobility that makes sight an incomplete 
     17. Levinas restates this relationship between the world and my intentions again: “The miracle of light is 
the essence of thought: due to the light an object, while coming from without, is already ours in the horizon 
which precedes it; it comes from an exterior already apprehended and comes into being as though it came 
from us, as though commanded by our freedom” (EE:41).
And again: “Light makes objects into a world, that is, makes them belong to us” (EE:40).
And again: “It takes form not in an additional quality inhering in objects, but in a destination inscribed in 
its revelation, in the revelation itself, in the light. Objects are destined for me; they are for me” (EE:30).
Derrida (1978: 92): “Everything given to me within light appears as given to myself by myself ”.
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relationship with the world.18 I, too, cannot survive merely by knowing or seeing that 
there is food for me to eat. what I am, alone and eminent, cannot sustain me in my sepa-
rateness. I need to feed and to grow and I must do this from what is separate from me, 
using more ‘vulgar modes’, from the ‘more vulgar’ aspects of the world. For, of course, 
I cannot feed off other nobilities;19 I will not eat (hu)man flesh. I have removed myself 
from the world, taken a step up, but in order to remain elevated—separate and alive in 
my separateness—I must constantly bolster what I am, using the world to do so. 
with my hungry stomach leading the way, I deal with this need by climbing back 
down from my elevated position and immersing myself in what I have only just man-
aged to separate from. But now that I must act upon my needs, will I not also sacrifice 
my elevation? To be certain, I maintain a separation from the world even when I am 
on the ground because of my visual distance, yet this does not necessarily ensure my 
‘transcendent’ distance. Need my return to the world be a relinquishing of elevation? 
Perhaps what happens to my elevation can be understood by keeping this in mind: 
my position of eminence only has meaning if there are ways that my eminence can be 
practised. “A king with no subjects to rule over ceases to be a king” (Jonas 1953: 149). I 
cannot simply look at what I need. I must have what I need. I must touch it. I must eat it. 
And with sight in charge, perhaps I can touch the world without any loss of eminence.
In order to explore this possibility, I return to that aspect of vision that deals with the 
unknowable. “The concept of intentionality is one specific direction; intention prohib-
its inundation by a field of undifferentiated sensibles” (wyschogrod 1980: 181).20 what 
this means is that the light that flows from my bonne conscience illuminates everything in 
the trajectory of my vision, voiding the space between the things that I see and me. As 
Levinas puts it:
The eye does not see the light, but the object in the light. Vision is therefore 
a relation with a ‘something’ established within a relation with what is not a 
‘something’. we are in the light inasmuch as we encounter the thing in nothingness. 
The light makes the thing appear by driving out the shadows; it empties space. It 
makes space arise specifically as a void (TI:189).
Even when I am immersed in the world, I am not touching the world. If I have my 
eyes open, then I am at a distance from the things that I am looking at; and if I am at a 
distance then this distance is a void. This is fine if I am only looking at what I want to eat. 
     18. “Sight…is incomplete by itself; it requires the complement of other senses…its highest virtues are also 
its essential insufficiencies. Its very nobility calls for the support of more vulgar modes of commerce with the 
importunity of things. In this sense…eminence pays for itself the price of increased dependence…” (Jonas 
1953: 135-6).
     19. It is interesting to note that, at one point in Totality and Infinity, Levinas interchanges ‘the absolutely 
other’ with ‘nobility’ when he describes the difference between ‘man’ and ‘non-man’: “It is this perpetual 
postponing of the hour of treason—infinitesimal difference between man and non-man—that implies the 
disinterestedness of goodness, the desire of the absolutely other or nobility, the dimension of metaphysics” 
(TI:35).
     20. wyschogrod’s “Doing before Hearing: On the primacy of touch” (1980) has been useful in alerting me 
to a particular passage on the privileges of vision in Totality and Infinity that I had initially overlooked and 
which comes into the discussion below (see TI:189-92).
ANGELA HIRST 169
But how can this ability to pass over nothingness translate into my contact with food?
Levinas draws a direct correlation between touch and vision: “Inasmuch as the 
movement of the hand that touches traverses the ‘nothing’ of space, touch resembles 
vision” (TI:189). If I am intent in my actions, if I see what I want to eat and then grasp 
it in my hand, then I will manage to traverse the void between me and my food. when 
I grasp something, I remove some of the usual elements of exploration that touch in-
volves. Instead of moving my hand over an object to explore its form, by grasping the 
object I have taken hold of it in a way that overrides any necessity to explore it.21 In seiz-
ing something, I acquire it, and then, perhaps, I may turn it over in my hands using my 
eyes to illuminate its form. For Levinas, grasping something is akin to comprehending 
it.22
All the unfathomable mystery of a thing shows itself to us and is open to our grasp. 
By virtue of its forms the world is stable and made up of solids. Objects can be 
defined by their finitude: form is just this way of coming to an end [finir] where the 
finite [le fini] is the definite and is already exposed to being apprehended (EE:33).
Grasping something is always a matter of avoiding what I do not want to touch. 
Grasping avoids the void;23 and in avoiding the void, it deems the void to be nothing. 
This again, is a confirmation of how Levinas views the relationship between a subject 
and the rest of the world. As a subject that can think, that can see, that knows itself to be 
hungry, that can grasp what it needs, it is I who determines the fate of the other.
To know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing, 
removing from it its alterity. This result is obtained from the moment of the first 
ray of light. To illuminate is to remove from being its resistance, because light 
opens a horizon and empties space—delivers being out of nothingness (TI:44).
I am dependent on the world, but this need not compromise my eminence. In fact, 
Jonas suggests that it is perhaps the ability to grasp that separates (hu)mans from the rest 
of the world, thereby ensuring our elevation:24
     21. Jonas (1953: 141) describes the difference between a static touch and feeling: “Thus mere touch-
impression changes into the act of feeling. There is a basic difference between simply having a tactile 
encounter and feeling another body. …The motor element introduces an essentially new quality into the 
picture: its active employment discloses spatial characteristics in the touch-object which were no inherent 
part of the elementary tactile qualities. …The touch-qualities become arranged in a spatial scheme, they 
fall into the pattern of surface, and become elements of form”. 
     22. Levinas also says: “Presence is now ‘at hand’” (NC:125). It is as if the necessity to explore an object 
through touch, into the future (point by point) is removed in this action. The future is deemed a recovery of 
the present. what is still to be known is yanked out of the future with one swift grasp. This grasping through 
knowledge, Levinas insists, should be taken literally: “The immanence of the known to the act of knowing 
is already the embodiment of seizure” (EFP:76). This is a subtlety that the translators of this Levinas paper 
“Non-intentional Consciousness” illuminate through their explanation of the word ‘maintenant,’ the French 
word for ‘now’, which means ‘main’ [hand] and ‘tenant’ [holding] (NC:fn.1,p.243). “Grasping” something 
is also used by Levinas interchangeably with “comprehending” something. I need not have it in my hand 
in order to grasp it.
Levinas also discusses Husserl’s epistemology in terms of grasping. See, “Beyond Intentionality” (1983).
     23. In Vasseleu’s words (1998: 86), this is a sort of “immobilisation”.
     24.Martin Heidegger (1968: 16) expresses the connection between grasping, hands and thinking in a 
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An organ for real shape-feeling exists probably only in the human hand…. There 
is a mental side to the highest performance of the tactile sense, or rather to the use 
which is made of its information, that transcends all mere sentience, and it is this 
mental use which brings touch within the dimension of the achievements of sight 
(Jonas 1953: 141-2).
The world relinquishes its autonomy to my need and my comprehension because 
its separateness is based on nothing. My hand becomes an extension of the ray of light 
that beams from my eyes. It traverses the scene before me and is only stopped by the 
surfaces of things. It is as if the world is a folded surface that can be smoothed by my 
understanding. My eyes need not delve any deeper and nor need my hand. Any depth 
that these things contain can be uncovered, with a little probing. The resistance that I 
do feel in them—the pressure of their form against my hand as I grasp them—is simply 
power for the cause. It proves the world to be separate from me. Separate, and indeed, 
not transcendent: 
If cognition in the form of the objectifying act does not seem to us to be at the level 
of the metaphysical relation, this is not because the exteriority contemplated as 
an object, the theme, would withdraw from the subject as fast as the abstractions 
proceed; on the contrary it does not withdraw enough (TI:109).
The world is either comprised of these opaque forms of things that display a little re-
sistance to my grasp, or is transparent, displaying no resistance to the penetrating beam 
of my bonne conscience.25 It is as if the glass wall that separates me from the world in my 
objectifying gaze still exists when I grasp the world. Although now the glass wall can be 
seen for what it is—something to look through, not at. The glass wall is not a physical 
barrier; it is no barrier at all. I must always consider it to be nothing if I am to maintain 
my sense of eminence in relation to the world. 
Fleeting enjoyment, or being hungry again
with my separation from the world, facilitated by my vision and my grasp, my (hu)
man potential continues to drift upward. I can sustain my elevation—my separateness—
by grasping the world with my eyes. The world appears as if given over to me, because, 
at this distance, it looks as if it is. But as a (hu)man, I am a series of endless needs, or hun-
gers, that must be satiated. I cannot content myself with surveying what I have already, 
through the light of my intentions, conquered. It is a little clearer why Levinas considers 
me to be a hungry stomach without ears. But there is a further part of the passage from 
Totality and Infinity that needs to be clarified. Levinas says: “In enjoyment I am absolutely 
slightly different, though concordant way: “Apes too have organs that can grasp, but they do not have 
hands. The hand is infinitely different from all grasping organs—paws, claws, or fangs—different by an 
abyss of essence. Only a being that can speak, that is, think, can have hands…”.
     25. Benso (2000: xxii) undertakes the important work of demonstrating otherwise in her book, The Face 
of  Things: A Different Side of  Ethics. She suggests that perhaps “things silently laugh at the illusory vanity of 
abstract philosophical speculation, which in its act of grasping irremediably loses exactly that which it 
thought it would be accessing”.
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for myself…without ears, like a hungry stomach” (TI:134). what is yet to be explained 
is why being a hungry stomach is the experience of enjoyment.
The interesting thing about hunger is that I do not experience it as a feeling of lack-
ing in something. How could I, a (hu)man standing so solidly conscious of what I am—
wrenched away from the world to make a refined totality—be lacking? No, according 
to Levinas: My needs constitute me as a lover of life. As a (hu)man, it is love of life that 
sets me apart from the rest of the world. It is not an attribute simply added onto being. 
As a (hu)man, life is love of life:
Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear 
to my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in the 
sun. Distinct from my substance but constituting it, these contents make up the 
worth [prix] of my life (TI:112).
I love that I am a hungry being who must seek out food in order to be satisfied. And 
I love that I will feel content once this hard work has been done. In addition to this, 
my ‘elevation’ above the world is further secured in my enjoyment. why? Because for 
Levinas, the fact that I would risk ‘being elevated’ for enjoyment proves that enjoyment 
is not an accident of being. It separates me from pure being, that is, from everything else 
that is not (hu)man, and it is in this sense that I ‘risk’ it.
One becomes a subject of being not by assuming being but in enjoying happiness, 
by the interiorization of enjoyment which is also an exaltation, an ‘above being’. 
The existent is ‘autonomous’ with respect to being; it designates not a participation 
in being, but happiness. The existent par excellence is man (TI:119).
If I were a less ‘elevated’ being in the world, a tree for instance, then I would not, 
according to Levinas, be capable of taking such a risk. “The I exists as separated in its 
enjoyment…and it can sacrifice its pure and simple being to happiness. It exists in an 
eminent sense; it exists above being” (TI:62-3). Levinas calls this elevation a sacrifice; 
I have lost what a tree maintains—that is, imperturbability in being. Levinas describes 
this ‘imperturbability’ as the “ataraxy” of pure being: there is no necessity, for a tree for 
instance, to generate meaning out of life. The difference for Levinas, then, between a 
tree’s existence and my existence is thus:
It [happiness] is an outcome, but one where the memory of the aspiration confers 
upon the outcome the character of an accomplishment, which is worth more than 
ataraxy. Pure existing is ataraxy; happiness is accomplishment (TI:113).
The difference between loving life and purely existing goes some way towards dem-
onstrating how I can maintain my ‘elevation’ even while being immersed in neediness. 
Happiness becomes my access to ‘height’.26
     26. As a riposte to Levinas, we could consider “love of life” using the terms that Elizabeth Costello (the 
protagonist from J.M. Coetzee’s eponymous novel), uses—that is, “an embodied soul”. On the surface, this is 
precisely the way that Levinas does think of (hu)mans. As Vasseleu (1998: 86-7) says: “The body, as the event 
of position, is the very advent of consciousness. Levinas rejects the dualist notion that consciousness can be 
divorced from a substantive. Consciousness begins as a sense of corporeality; as a sense of consciousness’s 
base or place, its point of departure, the condition of its inwardness or in-stance”. Although this does not 
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Another way that Levinas deals with the discrepancy between the simultaneous ele-
vation and groundedness of my position is by explaining my happy neediness as the con-
version of my elevation above the world into a temporal dispersion. The explanation of 
this leads on from the importance that enjoyment plays in my life. Levinas describes the 
condition of being a (hu)man, who is separate but happy with the neediness that this in-
curs, as an “act that resembles its ‘potency’” (TI:113). That is, enjoyment gives (hu)mans 
a reason to exist. In fact, for (hu)mans, happiness is what makes the activity of living pos-
sible, “if activity means a commencement occurring in duration, which nevertheless is 
continuous” (TI:113). The potency of enjoyment comes in its temporality, which is built 
on the temporality of satiation. “Pure existing is ataraxy; happiness is accomplishment. 
Enjoyment is made of the memory of its thirst; it is a quenching” (TI:113). I need the 
world, but I can see how to fulfil this need. I must grasp the world, eat it, and then I will 
no longer be hungry. However, I know this satiation will not last. I will be hungry soon 
enough. Being (hu)man means that my enjoyment will never last because my satiation 
never lasts, and therefore happiness comes again and again with every newly satisfied 
need. “Each happiness comes for the first time” (TI:114). This hunger and satiation and 
hunger again sets the condition for the continuity of living as a (hu)man. To be (hu)man 
is to live the beginning and ending of an infinite number of needs.27
Each moment of a need satiated marks an independence from the meaninglessness 
of just being alive. For Levinas, here again is proof that happiness is the mark of separa-
tion between (hu)mans and the rest of the world.28 It is not that a tree is not happy, but 
that it is not aware that this is happiness.29 Enjoyment is meaningless without recognition, 
by the tree, that the happiness that is with it for an instant will need to be replaced in the 
seem fundamentally different to the way Levinas imagines (hu)man life being filled by its contents, in 
Costello’s description, this filling of the body by the soul extends to all animals: “To be a living bat is to 
be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully human, which is also to be full of being. Bat being in 
the first case, human being in the second, maybe; but those are secondary considerations. To be full of 
being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of full being is joy. …To thinking, cogitation, I 
oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sensation of being—not a consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly 
reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the contrary the sensation—a heavily affective sensation—of 
being a body with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive to the world. This fullness contrasts 
starkly with Descartes’ key state [cogito, ergo sum], which has an empty feel to it: the feel of a pea rattling 
around in a shell” (Coetzee 2003: 75).
     27. “Desire as a relationship with the world involves both a distance between me and the desirable, and 
consequently a time ahead of me, and also a possession of the desirable which is prior to the desire. The 
position of the desirable, before and after the desire, is the fact that it is given. And the fact of being given 
is the world” (EE:30).
     28. Let me, again, counter this argument with one made by Elizabeth Costello: “Anyone who says that 
life matters less to animals than it does to us has not held in his hands an animal fighting for its life. The 
whole of the being of the animal is thrown into that fight, without reserve. when you say that the fight lacks 
a dimension of intellectual or imaginative horror, I agree. It is not the mode of being of animals to have an 
intellectual horror: their whole being is in the living flesh” (Coetzee 2003: 108).
     29. That is, a self-consciousness about happiness. Not all human emotions are accompanied by self-
consciousness, but in the case of nonhuman beings, it seems that all emotions are without self-consciousness 
(Nussbaum 2001: 126).
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next.30 On the other hand, I am reflective, and so I am aware that happiness does not 
last but instead must continually be reinstated. Separation is produced through my be-
ing a subject who is aware that I need the world but who can, over time, continually—
although be it momentarily—overcome this need. In Levinas’s words:
To be sure, need is also a dependence with regard to the other, but it is a dependence 
across time, a dependence that is not an instantaneous betraying of the same but 
a suspension or postponement of dependence… (TI:116).
I am a needy being, but I am liberated in this neediness. Separation becomes the dif-
ference between my needs and their satiation. This, rather than simply the present mo-
ment of happiness, is what defines the eminent position of the I in relation to the world. 
It is now possible to make a more specific statement about the relationship between 
happiness and height: it is the temporality of my enjoyment that becomes my ‘height’ 
above the world. 
A being…frees itself from all the weight of the world, from immediate and 
incessant contacts; it is at a distance. This distance can be converted into time, 
and subordinate a world to the liberated but needy being (TI:116).
Yet, the displacement of my elevation onto the fleeting nature of happiness places 
my transcendent potential in a precarious position. This is because if my happiness is 
only momentary, then I am not assured of always being happy. To be certain, I can, 
over time, again and again, rediscover happiness, but what if I cannot satisfy my next 
moment of need? According to Levinas, if I fail at happiness, then I suffer. Again, this 
suffering is not because I need, but because I need and cannot satiate my own neediness. 
I suffer because, from the beginning, my life is founded on happiness.
To despair of life makes sense only because originally life is happiness. Suffering 
is a failing of happiness; it is not correct to say that happiness is an absence of 
suffering. Happiness is made up not of an absence of needs, whose tyranny and 
imposed character one denounces, but of the satisfaction of all needs. For the 
privation of need is not just a privation, but is privation in a being that knows the 
surplus of happiness, privation in a being gratified (TI:115).
This is why Levinas describes my elevation also in terms of a sacrifice. “The I exists 
as separated in its enjoyment…and it can sacrifice its pure and simple being to happi-
ness. It exists in an eminent sense; it exists above being” (TI:62-3). I have given up my 
pure and simple being to a life dependent on happiness and therefore vulnerable to 
suffering. 
And without happiness, “life dissolves into a shadow” (TI:112).31 
     30. what seems to be missing in a tree and limited in nonhuman animals is the ability to have “temporal 
emotions”, which are emotions that involve memory or expectation—or in other words, that involve 
“conceiving of a life as a temporal process with a beginning, a development, and an end” (Nussbaum 
2001: 144). For the case of the difference between human emotions, such as happiness, and other animals’ 
emotions, see Upheavals of  Thought: The Intelligence of  Emotions (Nussbaum 2001: 89-138).
     31. “when reduced to pure and naked existence, like the existence of the shades Ulysses visits in Hades, 
life dissolves into a shadow” (TI:112).
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when one has to eat, drink and warm oneself in order not to die, when nourishment 
becomes fuel, as in certain kinds of hard labor, the world also seems to be at 
an end, turned upside down and absurd, needing to be renewed. Time becomes 
unhinged (EE:37).
Even if this does not mean death, death might prove more favourable than living 
life as a shadow.
The contents from which life lives are not always indispensable to it for the 
maintenance of that life, as means or as the fuel necessary for the ‘functioning’ of 
existence. Or at least they are not lived as such. with them we die, and sometimes 
prefer to die rather than be without them (TI:111).
So, with my happiness comes trepidation, because of the possibility of each moment 
of happiness being my last, and my life dissolving into a shadow. But what is this life as 
a shadow? we know that it is suffering, but is life as a shadow also life that has lost its 
separateness? For Levinas, is living as a shadow like living as an animal, or a plant, or an 
ocean, for whom awareness that happiness has been lost is not possible, for whom pure 
existence, happy or not, is the only possibility? In other words, is it that, as a lover of life, 
I am constantly at risk, because of the constancy of my neediness and my dependence 
on the world? Am I at risk of the world reabsorbing me? That is, I may not die, but I 
could become indistinguishable from all the other beings whose lives simply begin, then 
end? Might I lose my separateness? I am the one that must absorb the world in order to 
subsist in my happiness.
Such an explanation would situate separation as a (hu)man ‘experience’ or ‘privi-
lege’, rather than an attribute intrinsic to (hu)man existence. If I were to be reabsorbed 
by the world then I would lose my ability to enjoy the world and my eminence would fall 
heavily from its elevation. But this is not so. According to Levinas’s description of being 
(hu)man, I cannot remain (hu)man and return to the simple being of the rest of the world. 
My very (hu)manness is shaped by my separateness from the world. “The unicity of 
the I conveys separation. Separation in the strictest sense is solitude, and enjoyment—
happiness or unhappiness—is isolation itself (TI:117). If I lose myself in the world and 
become unable to rise above the risk it places in my future, then I do not simply accept 
this and fall into an apathy, or ataraxy, of the ‘simply existing’. No, if my happiness is 
threatened, then I do not fall from my eminence. I suffer in my separateness. I suffer, 
because from the beginning I am happiness. To suffer is to be separate but unhappy in 
this separateness. If I am inept at negotiating my separation and my need, for whatever 
reason, then I find myself in the precarious position of being needy without the potential 
to satiate my own neediness. I may find myself at the mercy of the world, with no control 
over what will become of me.
Let me put this in another way: I am still (hu)man—I still have a hand that has the 
intention to grasp the world, but I am now a shadow of that intention. In fact, it is on this 
nether side of (hu)man transcendence that I find the location of the ethical other. The 
ethical other lives life like a shadow. As a shadow, the ethical other has a hand of sorts, 
and perhaps even the intent, but not the ability to grasp. Instead of reaching out to grasp 
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the world, the ethical other’s hand faces up, outstretched and open. Alphonso Lingis 
says: “He faces me with his eyes, unmasked, exposed, and turns the primary nakedness 
of the eyes to me; he faces me with a gesture of his hand, taking nothing, empty-handed” 
(1986: 227). For Levinas, this is the absolute limit of (hu)man suffering. In order not to be 
hungry, in order not to suffer, the ethical other must rely on the world for satiation.
In the introduction to this section, I said that I would turn away from the height of 
the ethical other so that I might spend some time examining the world below. I have 
closed my ears to the call of the ethical other, and in the process, I have found enjoy-
ment. what I am learning is that I need this enjoyment if I am ever to respond to the 
ethical other. If I am not happy and satiated, then how can I give anything away? But 
in closing my ears to the ethical other, I have also closed my ears to the otherness of the 
world. I do not hear, or encounter, any otherness at all. And, as if in confirmation that 
there is nothing to hear, I also find that there is nothing to see. with my face turned away 
from the ethical other, I see only objects given over to my enjoyment. And between 
these objects and myself there is nothing. In my enjoyment, this nothingness that I can-
not see is my only experience of the otherness of the world. As a consequence, I hardly 
experience this nothingness at all.
2. EATING SENSIBLY AND THE ANXIETY OF THE IL Y A
Enjoyment does not refer to an infinity beyond what nourishes it, but to the virtual 
vanishing of  what presents itself, to the instability of  happiness. Nourishment 
comes as a happy chance (TI:141).
So far, I have written around the moment of satiation without directing my attention 
to what happens in the moment itself. we know what life is like just prior to satiation. I 
am separate and needy of the world. But I can see what I need and I can anticipate the 
satiation of my hunger. we know what life is like just after. I am full and happy, even if 
only momentarily. But during? Levinas says that, in enjoyment, I am a hungry stomach 
without ears. I know what this means for the world, and for the ethical other. Both will 
have their needs ignored. I will use my vision to turn away from the face of the ethical 
other and to make the world appear as given over to my needs. But still, what does this 
enjoyment, at the cost of the world and the ethical other, feel like to me?
To investigate this moment, I recap on the difference between myself with a need 
still requiring satiation, and myself with a satiated need: For Levinas, in both of these 
instances, there is a perceptual and spatial difference between me and the world. In 
both these cases, the otherness of the world is not my concern. Beyond the world’s slight 
resistance to my touch when I grasp it, and the sense of empty space that sits between 
me and the rest of the world, I do not seem to register any particularly potent otherness. 
Nothingness takes up the space between me and the objects of my need, and, mostly, I 
do not notice this space at all.
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But there are two moments when the otherness of the world affects me more direct-
ly, and both occur in the temporal gap between need and satiation. In this gap, I find 
myself, not at a distance from the world, but absorbed by the world. The nothingness 
that once sat behind and around the objects of my need, as void, floods into my im-
mediate space, so that I cannot gain a perspective on it, so that I cannot see it, so that I 
cannot think it. If I maintain control over my life, then I can grasp things and not experi-
ence this flooding. If I let go into my life, either through enjoyment or anxiety, then this 
otherness grasps me. Sometimes Levinas calls this otherness the “element”. Sometimes he 
calls it the “il y a”.32,33 In this section, I try to explain how my experience of the otherness 
of the world can change from being purely contented sensibility in enjoyment to utterly 
terrifying in anxiety.34
Experiencing the contentment of  sensibility
One of the best examples of the first way that I experience the otherness of the world 
is when I eat something. A moment such as this takes “I am a hungry stomach without 
ears” to another dimension. Up until this moment, being a hungry stomach without 
ears has meant that I have used my senses in a way that would maximise my capac-
ity to glean sustenance from the world: I used my vision to locate what will satiate my 
hunger, and then I used my hands (facilitated by my vision) to grasp this food in a way 
that undermines the usual reciprocity of touch. In both of these engagements, I have 
     32. In English, the il y a translates to “there is”.
     33. Some contend that Levinas conflates the “element” and the “il y a” (translator’s note in  TO:fn.15), while 
others that the il y a is the limit of the element (see also wyschogrod 1989: 186). This second position seems 
to be closer to Levinas’s explanation of the relationship between the element and the il y a. In Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas says: “The elemental extends into there is” (TI:142). Perhaps it is this limiting characteristic 
of the il y a that means that it is often used in negative terms by both Levinas and his commentators. 
Conversely, Levinas seems to use the term “element” when he is speaking of enjoyment.
In Existence and Existents, Levinas uses the term “il y a” exclusively. See the sections “Existence with Existents,” 
and “Insomnia” (EE:51-64); in Time and the Other, Levinas uses the term “il y a” (TO:44-51); in Totality 
and Infinity, Levinas uses the term “the elemental” in “Element and Things, Implements,” “Sensibility,” 
“The Mythical Format of the Element,” and “The Home and Possession” (TI:130-2,135-40,140-142); in 
“Sensibility and the Face” (TI:190-1) he uses the “il y a”; and in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas 
returns to exclusive use of “il y a” in the sections entitled “Being’s ‘Other’,” “Sense and the There Is,” and at 
the beginning of the concluding chapter “Outside” (OB:3-4,162-5,176-8). In “Signature,” in Difficult Freedom, 
Levinas refers to the il y a (S:292) and in his essay “On Maurice Blanchot,” in Proper Names (OMB:127-70) 
Levinas describes the origins of the term “il y a”.
     34. For examples of how others have interpreted the il y a and the elemental, see John Sallis’s “Levinas 
and the Elemental” (1998); Simon Critchley’s “Il y a—A Dying Stronger than Death (Blanchot with 
Levinas)” (1993), and his book Very Little…Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (1997: 31-83); Philip 
Lawton’s “Levinas’s Notion of the ‘There Is’” (1976); John Caruana’s “The Catastrophic ‘Site and Non-
Site’ of Proximity: Redeeming the disaster of being” (1998); Edith wyschogrod’s “Derrida, Levinas, and 
Violence” (1989); Maurice Blanchot’s Thomas the Obscure (1973: chapter two); and Danne Polk’s “Good 
Infinity/Bad Infinity: Il y a, Apeiron, and Environmental Ethics in the Philosophy of Levinas” (2000). Most of 
these theorists concentrate their readings on the il y a, with only brief reference to the elemental. However, 
Polk (2000: 36-7) and Perperzak’s “Levinas on Technology and Nature” (1992: 475-6) describe the elemental 
in terms of enjoyment rather than (or as well as, in the case of Polk) horror. 
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maintained my distance from the world.
But when I actually eat the food that I have gleaned, what then? I return to the 
chicken soup I was eating in the last section. I bring the spoonful of soup to my lips and 
sip. Once liquid is inside my mouth, I can no longer see it. And if I can no longer see 
it, I can no longer grasp it. All I experience of chicken soup now are the sensations of it 
in my mouth—how it feels on my tongue, against my teeth, how the broth deepens and 
then sours slightly as I swallow. Sight has lost its usefulness, and I discard it in favour of 
the enjoyment of savouring the taste and texture of my meal: I close my eyes.
And what happens to the distance between me and my food in this moment? It 
entirely dissipates. while I am savouring this mouthful of food, there is no physical 
distance between me and the world. I become my sensations. Food macerated in the 
mouth becomes me. Besides the lack of recognition I have of the nothingness that sits 
between me and the world, this is my first real experience of the otherness of the world. 
“The objects of the world, which for thought lie in the void, for sensibility—or for life—
spread forth on a horizon which entirely hides that void” (TI:135). “Sensibility”35 is my 
experience of this otherness that Levinas describes as the “the elemental”.36
Once I am absorbed in the taste of this soup, I do not know what is happening—I 
simply live what is happening: “One does not know, one lives sensible qualities: the green 
of these leaves, the red of this sunset” (TI:135). when I think, my self moves outward to 
encapsulate the world. In this sensibility, the element comes incessantly upon me,
…as the wave that engulfs and submerges and drowns—an incessant movement 
of afflux without respite, a total contact without fissure nor gap from which the 
reflected movement of a thought could arise. It is to be within, to be inside of… 
(TI:135). 
If I am to enjoy something, I have no choice but to relinquish my separation from 
the world. I must surrender my distance to the pleasure of intimate contact. I cannot 
maintain a distance from this elemental experience, because it does not cling to some-
thing that I can distance myself from. In Levinas’s words:
The solidity of the earth that supports me, the blue of the sky above my head, 
the breath of the wind, the undulation of the sea, the sparkle of the light do not 
cling to a substance. They come from nowhere. This coming from nowhere, from 
‘something’ that is not, appearing without there being anything that appears—and 
consequently coming always, without my being able to possess the source—delineates 
the future of sensibility and enjoyment (TI:141).37
     35. “Sensibility establishes a relation with a pure quality without support, with the element. Sensibility is 
enjoyment” (TI:136).
     36. “Every relation or possession is situated within the non-possessable which envelops or contains without 
being able to be contained or enveloped. we shall call it the elemental” (TI:131).
     37. Here, Levinas says that these sensible qualities do not cling to a substance. But at other times he says 
that they do: “Sensibility does not aim at an object, however rudimentary. It concerns even the elaborated 
forms of consciousness, but its proper work consists in enjoyment, through which every object is dissolved 
into the element in which enjoyment is steeped. For in fact, the sensible objects we enjoy have already 
undergone labor. The sensible quality already clings to a substance” (TI:137). In this passage, Levinas 
justifies this ‘clinging to substance’ through the object’s exposure to “labor”. Here, Levinas is beginning 
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His descriptions of the element coming always with its incessant movement—it seems as 
if my absorption in the element could go on forever. But why, after all the effort I have 
put into maintaining a safe distance from the world, would I allow such a situation of 
complete, and potentially infinite, absorption, to occur? I would suggest that I allow this 
immersion in the element, because it does have an end. From my previous experience, 
I know that the world eventually withdraws from me. I taste the rich complexity of the 
broth, I melt the silk texture of it onto my tongue, and then, gradually, its pleasures dissi-
pate into memory. Until the next mouthful of soup, I am again separate from the world. 
I no longer taste it. Again and again, I dip into my bowl to reacquaint myself with the 
pleasure of immersion, and again and again, I manage to swim through this immedi-
ate sensibility and find myself separate on the other side. Once the bowl is emptied, I 
am satisfied. My stomach is full. I allow myself to be absorbed in the pleasure of these 
sensible qualities because I know that they will satisfy me. “Objects content me…” (TI:135).38 
Nourishment, exemplified by alimentation, is this satisfying process of enjoyment:
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the 
same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as 
other…as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, 
my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is in this sense alimentation 
(TI:111).
And once I am contented, I know that I will return to separateness. I know this 
because I remember being satisfied before. I know these things before I begin to eat. I 
know them before I lose my thoughts to the sensibility of the world. If I did not know 
such things before I took my first mouthful of soup, then I may not take it at all.
So, in this scene, my experience of the space between myself and the world has 
completed a circle. “Things come to representation from a background from which they 
emerge and to which they return in the enjoyment we can have of them” (TI:130). The 
middle state of immersion is exactly that: It sits in between my need and the satisfaction 
of that need as a finite space. I move from a state of separation, (albeit, a hungry, needy 
separation) to a state of immersion, back to a state of separation (with a full stomach). 
Another way this movement can be understood is as a journey from illumination, to a 
time of darkness, back to a state of illumination. This middle space of sensibility, wedged 
between my need and its satiation, is the moment when I experience the mystery of 
life. But then, as Benso states, this mystery is “immediately recuperated through the 
awareness of one’s own sensibility and sensory perception” (2000: xxxiii). I experience 
this mystery, this darkness, because, momentarily, I relinquish my grasp of the world. I 
abandon myself to this darkness. I may even close my eyes in order to further enjoy the 
to set up an important distinction between the world that has undergone labor (and that therefore allows 
sensible quality to cling to it) and the world that has not undergone labour (and that therefore sensible 
qualities cannot cling to).
     38. This phrase comes from a larger statement: “Objects content me in their finitude, without appearing 
to me on a ground of infinity. The finite without the infinite is possible only as contentment. The finite as 
contentment is sensibility” (TI:135). Later, it will be apparent that what is finite about objects is that they 
create containers for the otherness of the world.
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sensations in my mouth. (Am I a satiated stomach without eyes?)39 But on the other side, 
I regain my separation and the world returns to its distant place within my perspective. 
And what about the otherness of the world? Again, it becomes that void space between 
the world and me. 
Experiencing the horror of  the il y a
Sometimes, this scene is not quite so circular. Sometimes, instead of my consuming 
of the world going through a complete cycle of need to enjoyment to satiation to need 
and around again, it gets caught in the middle space of immersion. Levinas describes 
this as my being delivered over to the element:
Possession by enjoyment is one with enjoyment: no activity precedes sensibility. But 
to possess by enjoying is also to be possessed and to be delivered to the fathomless 
depth, the disquieting future of the element (TI:158).
Something goes wrong in that moment of pure sensibility that changes it from enjoy-
ment to “horror” (EE:56-8). At such times, instead of the element serving as an access to 
satiation, it delivers me over to the world and its otherness. I am absorbed by the world, 
experiencing, with pure sensibility, intimate contact. I am swimming for the edge of this 
space of immediacy, and yet I cannot reach this edge.
Or, at least, I think that I will not find it. Both the light of my bonne conscience and my 
intentions for reaching the other side of this immediacy are absorbed by this nothing-
ness surrounding me. I cannot see anything. This moment is terrifying: not because I 
have finally dissolved into this immediacy, never to be able to reunite the parts of my 
self that make me into a separated, elevated being, but because I anticipate such a future 
for myself. Perhaps I cannot find the edge of this space because I am so terrified of not 
finding the edge. This anticipation of failure is my second experience of the otherness of 
the world. Levinas describes this otherness as the “il y a”. He says it is a place in which 
nothingness reigns. There are no things. There is no way that I can be there. The il y 
a is a space denuded of every thing, including me. Because I cannot be where there is 
nothing, substantiating the nature of this otherness of the world is impossible. I, as an ‘el-
evated’ (hu)man, must remove myself from the world, as well as relinquish my elevated 
perspective on the world. I must turn off the lights to my bonne conscience and try to hear 
or smell or taste what the world looks like—I certainly cannot see it. To see it would mean 
that I would create a world shaped by my intentions to know it, a world formed by my 
perspective. That is, according to Levinas, there is no formed matter without my need 
to make it manifest. without me, there is only matter—pure materiality, an ‘existence’ 
removed of its ‘existents’ (EE:51). In order to understand the il y a, I must try to describe 
a scene that I can never witness, because it is a scene that exists without ‘me.’ For Levi-
     39. I need not necessarily close my eyes in order to experience the sensible. The immediately sensible can 
also be visual, but this would be a visual experience entirely different from the detached distant vision that 
facilitates thought. Perhaps, it can be understood to be a little more like the visual experience of the ethical 
encounter. In the face to face encounter, Levinas describes both hearing and seeing as more akin to touch. 
“The visible caresses the eye. One sees and hears like one touches” (LP:118).
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nas, though, what so usefully stands in for the impossible is my ability to imagine such a 
scene (EE:57-8; TO:46).40 So, I will imagine: I imagine I reach the il y a.
To reach the place of pure existence, it is necessary to imagine that everything 
around me has disappeared. First, the words I am reading vanish letter by letter, then 
the keyboard that I tap my words into falls away leaving the surface of my desk, then, 
the desk itself disappears, then the light cast through the form of my lamp, then the walls 
and floor of my room. As if setting up a chain reaction, every thing that touches some 
other thing, with this touch, passes on its own disappearance to the other, until there 
is nothing left—except, of course, me. I stay long enough to survey the expansiveness 
of this disappearance, and then, after the shortest of instances, even I am gone. Once 
I take my leave, I have reached a place that cannot be reached. There are no words to 
read, there is no lamp to see them by, or desk or room or city or a consciousness to wit-
ness this pure existence. If I were able to reach this place, I would not even be capable 
of knowing I was there. But what, then, is there? There is nothing. The world is left with 
nothing—yet still there persists something of this nothingness. And what persists is “the 
fact that there is” (TO:46).
This impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable ‘consummation’ of being, 
which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the term 
there is. The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is ‘being in general’ 
(EE:52).
Although Levinas describes the il y a as a persistence of nothingness, this does not 
mean that he imagines it as a void. It is not a coalescence of the negative spaces remain-
ing when the positive space of subjects and their objects disappear. Such a space would 
be an absence of any presence. Rather than a removal, the il y a is a submergence; it is a 
swallowing up of the possibility of individual beings by “being in general”. The disappear-
ance of beings is achieved through the reappearance of being. So there is existence, but, ac-
cording to Levinas, no thing to take up this existence. The il y a is full of the “presence of 
absence” (EE:60), full of the presence of nothingness, full of the absence of everything.
But the il y a is an absence of my presence. It is empty of the light of my bonne con-
science; empty of materiality, corporeality and individuality. It is removed of me. There 
is no world as I know it, for the world is illuminated and given form through my bonne 
conscience. Because I cannot ever reach a place where “I” am not, anticipating the il y a is 
my only access to the il y a. It is always a potential, never an actual; It is an otherness I 
can never reach.41
     40. Sallis (1998: 154) on Levinas’s strategy of employing the imagination to find the il y a: “In order to 
approach this existing without existents, Levinas calls upon imagination. Omitting all indications as to how 
imagination is to be construed here, how it is to be, as it were, detached from the complex of determinations 
it has undergone from Plato on, omitting also all indications regarding the complicity of imagination with 
the question of being, Levinas simply proposes that we imagine something, or rather, that we imagine—
or try to imagine—nothingness”. See also Polk’s (2000: 36) paper, in which he describes Levinas’s use of 
imagination to explore the il y a as a critical response to Husserl’s famous passage in Ideas I, where he tries 
to imagine the total annihilation of the world. See also wyschogrod (1989: 184).
     41. Is this space of nothingness what Lyotard is invoking when he describes what happens when our 
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I can imagine that this world of the il y a is not the world as it is now. I suggest that 
Levinas imagines that this is a world removed of every thing because of his crucial belief 
in the illumination and form that our (hu)man bonne conscience provides the world. But 
what if, rather than imagining this world as a world without things, we imagine it as a 
world without our bonne conscience? Thinking of the il y a in this way explains why I can 
experience the horror of the il y a when I am still conscious and in the world. The space 
of the il y a is not simply emptied of things as much as it is emptied of my bonne conscience. 
Levinas might say that these scenes are one and the same thing: Both the objects of the 
world and my consciousness of them are my presentations. One is the outside of me, and 
one is the inside of me. But a world emptied of my intentions is much more frightening 
to an elevated, needy being than a world without things. without my bonne conscience, I 
no longer have a mechanism for shedding light on the world; I no longer have a way of 
understanding the world as given over to me. I can no longer grasp the world. And to be truly 
horrified, all I must do is imagine such a place. The world looks exactly the same; I can 
still see things, but I have no control over them. The il y a is full with the absence of my 
intent.42 The anticipation of the il y a submerges me, swallows up my expectation of the 
future based on the happiness of the past. It removes my control from every present mo-
ment, until all that is left is persistence in being—not my being, but being in general, or 
perhaps the being of beings that do not exercise such a conscious intent upon the world. 
The world is full with this absence of my intent, “like a density of the void, like a mur-
mur of silence” (EE:59);43 or, perhaps, like the sounds of a language I do not understand, 
or of wind moving through trees.
Perhaps the answers to these questions can be sought in wyschogrod’s description 
of the il y a: a space in which being in general persists and submerges all formation of 
beings, as “an ontological ‘black hole’” (1989: 184). No formation of being can escape the 
pull of its undifferentiated space. Levinas calls it “nocturnal space” (EE:52).44 This gives 
us a hint at its appearance perhaps. But he clearly distinguishes between a phenomeno-
sun explodes in 4.5 billion years? “Negation without remainder. No self to make sense of it. Pure event. 
Disaster…. Matter asks no questions, expects no answers of us. It ignores us. It made us the way it made all 
bodies—by chance and according to its laws” (Lyotard 1991: 8-11).
     42. Polk (2000: 36): “to imagine the total annihilation of the world is to imagine the loss of intentional 
consciousness as well”.
     43. Or, an “atmospheric density, a plenitude of the void, or the murmur of silence” (TO:46). 
     44. Levinas draws on Blanchot for his depictions of the il y a as night; and Blanchot (1986: 49) writes that 
the il y a is Levinas’s most fascinating concept. In Existence and Existents, Levinas takes a definition of the il y a 
directly from Blanchot’s Thomas l’ Obscure: “The presence of absence, the night, the dissolution of the subject 
in the night, the horror of being, the return of being to the heart of every negative movement, the reality of 
irreality are there admirably expressed” (EE:fn.1,p.58). See also Levinas’s essay on Blanchot in Proper Names 
where he refers to Blanchot’s “second night” or “black light” (OMB:133,137), which are two variants on a 
series of terms Blanchot (1981: 102) uses to describe the il y a, the others being “Night” or “other night”.
Many links have been made between Blanchot and Levinas. For examples, see Levinas’s own discussions of 
Blanchot in Proper Names (OMB:127-70). See also Purcell’s “The Ethical Significance of Illeity” (1996: 128-9); 
John Caruana’s “The Catastrophic ‘Site and Non-Site’ of Proximity” (1998); Critchley’s Very Little…Almost 
Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature, and “Il y a—A dying stronger than death,” (1993); and Davies’s “A linear 
narrative? Blanchot with Heidegger in the work of Levinas” (1990).
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logical night, that is, the night that appears after day, and the il y a’s night of anonymous 
existence. If the il y a were understood as the night that is opposite to day, that is, as a 
duration of time without light, this would underestimate the indeterminacy of the il y a 
in two significant ways.
Firstly, a phenomenological night involves the dimming of light. On the other hand, 
the il y a is a darkness that would be better described as blackness, because blackness is 
more than a lack of enough light to illuminate the forms of the world. The blackness 
of Levinas’s il y a is a true blackness, the result of the absorption of all light. I could not 
project my consciousness to such a place to illuminate my existence, because this night 
absorbs the possibility before I can even formulate the intent. The il y a cannot be seen; 
the il y a can only ever be barely imagined by me. In the world that I inhabit, do I imag-
ine this il y a sitting enclosed within the forms of things? Do I know it is there although 
I do not know what it looks like, nor will I ever know?
So how do I experience the terror of this blackness, if not with my eyes? In face of 
the knowledge that it is unseeable, still, I try to see it with my eyes. Faced with the fact 
that it is unknowable, I persist in trying to imagine it with my mind. Once, lost in the 
bush, I came close to the horror of the il y a. For two days, my friend and I trekked, 
looking but finding no way out. we were trapped, deep within a valley, forced through a 
stream bound on either side by bush and mountains. At one point, the stream turned a 
sharp corner and opening out before us were towering sheer cliffs. Nestled in the cracks 
in its face were dozens of egrets. Remembering that scene now, I can say that it was 
intensely beautiful. But at the time, I looked but did not see it. All that I had at that time 
was fear. I could ‘see’ no way out of this elemental space,45 I could see nothing in this 
     45. At times such as this, I do not experience the element as something containable. “The element has 
no forms containing it; it is content without form. Or rather it has but a side: the surface of the sea and of 
the field, the edge of the wind; the medium upon which this side takes form is not composed of things. It 
unfolds in its own dimension: depth, which is inconvertible into the breadth and length in which the side of 
the element extends” (TI:131). Lingis, in translating this passage, uses “side,” rather than “face,” to translate 
this term, in order to reserve the English term “face” for the face of a (hu)man for “visage” (translator’s 
note in TI:131). I consider this to be quite an interesting turn: is the face of  the elemental removed from its 
close association with the face of the Other through a translation? But then Levinas says: “To tell the truth 
the element has no side at all. One does not approach it. The relation adequate to its essence discovers it 
precisely as a medium: one is steeped in it; I am always within the element” (TI:131).
There are other moments when Levinas seems to create a more confused line between the il y a and 
alterity. In “God and Philosophy,” Levinas describes God as having a sort of ultra-alterity, “other than the 
other, other otherwise,” which takes God closer to the il y a than the face: “prior to the ethical bond with 
another and different from every neighbor, transcendent to the point of absence, to the point of a possible 
confusion with the stirring of the there is” (GP:165-6). Caruana (1998: 41) explains the reason for this move 
by Levinas as thus: “For the later Levinas, it is structurally important to maintain the possibility of seeing 
in the il y a a face of an irate God who attacks the self in the Night of existence”. wyschogrod writes that 
Blanchot reads the same alliance between Levinas’s concept of the il y a and transcendence: “Blanchot 
interprets the il y a…as an effort to describe the obverse of transcendence” (wyschogrod 1989: 183). Note 
that the ‘obverse’ is defined as a ‘counterpart’ of something, or that which complements something else. 
Interestingly, this reading of the il y a being complementary to transcendence has been slightly lost in the 
translation of Blanchot’s paper (1986: 49), through the use of the word ‘reverse’ instead of ‘obverse.’ Still, the 
point is there: “The there is is…Levinas’s…temptation, too, since as the reverse of transcendence it is thus 
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space, devoid of my intent.
Secondly, the night of the il y a differs from a phenomenological night in how it 
persists, in its blackness, as a continuous indeterminacy enduring beyond the possibil-
ity of light (EE:53). The night that is the opposite of a phenomenological day ends with 
light. But the night of the il y a is neverending. This is the ataraxy of purely being (TI:113). 
It is the inability for ‘failure’ to shake being’s intent to purely be. This is the same ataraxy 
Levinas finds in the life of a tree, or the life of a nonhuman animal, or the life of the sea. 
However, my experience of this nocturnal ataraxy of the il y a differs from the way trees 
or animals experience it: from the outset, my life is ‘above being’. I cannot experience 
the imperturbable existence of a tree, because I will always think about imperturbability. 
I will always be separate from it; I will always be outside of it. And the ataraxy of pure 
being, when experienced from the outside, is terrifying. It represents a continuation of 
the future that is no longer mine to claim enjoyment from. The il y a when I was lost 
terrified me, because I could see no end to it. The egrets, trees and rocks were the only 
witnesses to my existence, and in their imperturbability did not care whether I lived or 
died.
According to Levinas, my fear in these moments is not a fear of death (EE:57).46 
Vasseleu (1998: 85) describes the nature of my fear as thus: “The presence of night—a 
collapse of things into indeterminate nothing, a horror which can also occur in the 
midst of daylight—erodes the continuity of consciousness”. It erodes my love of life (the 
temporality of happiness): The il y a is the potential for suffering. This is “the unforesee-
able future of the element”:
…not because it exceeds the reach of vision, but because, faceless and losing itself 
in nothingness, it is inscribed in the fathomless depth of the element, coming from 
an opaque density without origin, the bad infinite or the indefinite, the apeiron 
not distinct from it either”.
     46. Levinas deals specifically with death in the following passages: Time and the Other (67-79); Totality and 
Infinity (232-40). Lawton makes the following points about Levinas’s subtle analysis of death: (1) Levinas 
argues that death taken to be annihilation is impossible, because there is always “pure existence” or “l’il y a”. (2) 
Levinas rejects Heidegger’s notion that death is a liberty. Rather, he suggests that the relation with death is 
an experience of pure passivity; (3) Finally, for Levinas, suicide is a contradictory concept (Lawton 1976: 75, 
n.30). On all these points, see also Critchley’s book: Very Little…Almost Nothing (1997: 31-83). John Caruana 
points out that Levinas’s analysis of death paves the way for his conception of ethics. This is demonstrated 
in the way that Levinas reads Hamlet’s utterance, To be or not to be? as having ethics rather than ontology as 
its premise. “‘It is the human possibility to dread injustice more than death’ that reveals to us the truth of 
what it means to be a human being. And once again, Levinas concludes: ‘To be or not to be, is perhaps not 
the question par excellence’” (Caruana 1998: fn.5). 
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(TI:158).47 There is nothing to grasp.48,49
The switch between experiencing the element as the very essence of sensual enjoy-
ment and experiencing the element as the very essence of terror is dependent on anxi-
ety. If I feel insecure about my future, my whole experience of the world can turn on 
me. Levinas explains: 
The element suits me—I enjoy it; the need to which it responds is the very mode 
of this conformity or of this happiness. The indetermination of the future alone 
brings insecurity to need, indigence: the perfidious elemental gives itself while 
escaping (TI:141).50
In Existence and Existents, Levinas uses the example of insomnia to demonstrate the 
power of anxiety to turn a situation of pleasure into a situation of terror. In this case, the 
potential satiation of tiredness is turned into the impossibility of sleep:
The impossibility of rending the invading, inevitable, and anonymous rustling of ex-
istence manifests itself particularly in certain times when sleep evades our appeal. One 
     47. Interestingly, the narrator in Sue woolfe’s novel, Leaning Towards Infinity (1996: 274), is amused about 
the use of the word “apeiron” to describe infinity, because it means “something despised”. She continues 
“My mother’s scarlet pen had laughed about apeiron, the ancient Greek word: ‘the word for infinity, meant 
something as dull, as grubby as a dirty handkerchief. (as my apron???) [The ancient Greeks] didn’t want 
anything so incomplete as apeiron.’” This, woolfe’s narrator speculates, is why the Greeks invented pi. 
“They wanted a simple, underlying pattern. So spell-binding, it stopped thought’” (woolfe 1996: 304).
     48. Levinas identifies his analysis of the il y a with Blanchot’s “disaster” (EI:fn.p.50). Caruana (1998: 
42) investigates Blanchot’s (1986) use of the term in The Writing of  the Disaster: “Blanchot exploits the rich 
etymology of the world désastre: to exist or live without a guiding star. The disaster (from the Italian disastro, 
no star) is the worst possible prognosis in augury, signifying that one is born either under an unlucky star 
or without a star with which to plan a course of life. For Blanchot, the disaster is dreadful, effrayant (frayer is 
to clear a path; hence, ef-frayant literally means to be without a path of direction). The disaster is absolutely 
terrifying because there is no direction or point of reference by which to orient life”.
Returning to the point I made in an early footnote (fn.13 in section one), addressing the use of a horizon 
to make comprehension of objects relational: in the il y a, rather than a horizon organising materiality, 
according to Levinas, “there is a swarming of points” (EE:53). These points in space do not refer to each 
other. There is no horizon and therefore no perspective and no distance. This is why the il y a is a situation 
that involves no one and no thing. 
     49. Levinas refers to this ocean: “Nothingness is still envisaged as the end and limit of being, as an ocean 
which beats up against it on all sides” (EE:60).
In this sense, the experience of the il y a does not seem that dissimilar to the ethical relation. There is no place 
outside of the il y a from which to view it. Is this not how Levinas describes the face to face encounter, that is, 
as a relation with no relation? Caruana (1998: 33) looks at the movement from the “unredeemed disaster” 
of the il y a to the “catastrophic redemption” of the face to face encounter. whereas the disaster is terrifying 
because from within it, I have no sense of direction, no sense of how to hold onto the future for myself, it 
seems the catastrophe is an altogether different experience of the future. “The Greek katastrophe originally 
signified an overturning. …‘catastrophe’ in the context of Levinas’s work has to be understood primarily 
in a Jewish manner, rather than a Greek one. …In this particular context, catastrophe is inseparable from 
theophany—the manifestation of God as the agent of catastrophic events—and issues relating to justice and 
ethics” (42). In the disaster, there is no direction for me. In the catastrophe, “god” (re)directs my path.
     50. Polk (2000: 36) puts this anxiety in terms of “an attack”: “we fear this impersonal being because it is 
alien to the self; anonymous, it attacks us from the future; it dissolves the ‘here now’ into a ‘nowhere,’ into 
an impossibility of determination”.
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watches on when there is nothing to watch and despite the absence of any reason for 
remaining watchful. The bare fact of presence is oppressive; one is held by being, held 
to be. One is detached from any object, any content, yet there is presence (EE:61).51
with the power of this anxiety in mind, I return to eating and ask does eating also 
hold the potential of such terror? Eating does seem to present the possibility of a dif-
ferent spatial experience of the il y a. For, if I experience the terror of the il y a when I 
am lost in the wilderness, then it comes to me from the outside in—a gradual working 
away at me interiorly by the undifferentiated presence of the exterior world. In eating, I 
would experience this dissolution from the inside out. There are nonetheless similarities 
between the terror of the il y a that Levinas describes and the scene that I face everyday 
as I eat. I enjoy my food, I experience with pure sensibility its flavours and textures in 
my mouth. I swallow. Once I swallow, I relinquish control over what happens next. As 
was the case while I was chewing my food, my eyes remain unable to keep the process 
in check. I lose my intentions to biological process.52 But on the possibility of eating pro-
voking anxiety in me, Levinas remains silent. In the place of such a possibility, he simply 
writes: “Nourishment comes as a happy chance” (TI:141).
     51. Benso (2000: 166) offers us another way of thinking about this—that is, that attention, or listening, 
which are two aspects of the ethical encounter, can also be likened to insomnia.
     52. Interestingly, if I do see this process in action, then I tend to be repelled—not terrified, but I experience 
a form of disgust at what should be going on inside my body rather than outside. Vomit, faeces, people 
eating with their mouths open—all these things uncompromisingly expose me to the dissolving barriers 
between myself and the world. Kristeva refers to this as “abjection”. In a definition that could just as easily 
be used to describe my terror of the il y a, Kristeva (1980 (1988): 135-6) says abjection “is an extremely 
strong feeling which is at once somatic and symbolic, and which is above all a revolt of the person against 
an external menace from which one wants to keep oneself at a distance, but of which one has the impression 
that it is not only an external menace but that it may menace us from inside. So it is a desire for separation, 
for becoming autonomous and also the feeling of an impossibility of doing so…”. when she introduces 
the notion in Powers of  Horror, Kristeva (in Oliver 1997: 230-1) uses the human relationship to food as a 
prototypical example of abjection. In the case of food, rather than to terrify, the abject makes me feel like 
throwing up. It is disgusting to me. “Food loathing is perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of 
abjection. when the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of milk—harmless, thin as a sheet of 
cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail paring—I experience a gagging sensation and, still farther down, spasms in 
the stomach, the belly…. Along with sight-clouding dizziness, nausea makes me balk at that milk cream…”. 
I think that the reason it has this effect is the same reason that the il y a terrifies: the abject threatens my 
identity because it threatens the distinctions between subject and object, between what I intend and what I 
never intended. And for some reason, I feel better if this dissolution remains invisible to me—hidden by the 
body. For Kristeva, this abjection has a very important consequence- it helps me separate: “since this food 
is not an ‘other’ for ‘me,’ …I expel myself, I spit myself  out, I abject myself within the same motion through 
which “I” claim to establish myself. …I give birth to myself amid the violence of…vomit” (in Oliver 1997: 
231).
And some foods seem to “exude” the il y a even before I have begun to eat them. There are foods that look 
or taste or smell like bodily fluids such as the mucilaginous okra; or foods that smell like acrid sweating 
bodies, such as blue cheese; or foods that smell like rotting flesh, such as the durian; or foods with eyes; or 
foods that bleed. See also Rosemary Pringle and Susan Colling’s (1993) work on the relationship between 
women and butchery and its link to the abject. “Kristeva argues that becoming abject is the body’s defence 
against cannibalism. If it is disgusting, it won’t be eaten” (in Oliver 1993: fn.10).
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Returning to elevation (from a different perspective)
At this stage, as I am on my journey towards the ethical encounter, the potential of 
exposure to the il y a has a more potent hold on my actions than any potential of a face 
to face encounter with the Other. But if my enjoyment relinquishes my control over my 
future, then how will I ever reach the ethical encounter? 
For Levinas, to encounter the face of the ethical Other, I must separate from and 
elevate above the world. In this movement, two relationships with the world crystallise, 
both intricately and inextricably interwoven with my neediness. 
The first is a relationship built on happiness. I need the world, and my neediness is happi-
ness. The world that I need I see from my elevated perspective. From here, I can see its 
limitations; from here, the light of my consciousness illuminates much of it, and what my 
light does not reveal is only in shadow. with the turning of the world, all its aspects will 
be revealed. Every part of it is within my grasp. It is shaped by my need. It is other to 
me, but only to the extent that it is not yet me. It is not other in the radical sense that (hu)
man alterity is, that is, an otherness that defies my understanding. The world’s otherness 
is that which resists my sameness, but it is ultimately understood.
But the elevation I have established I must ‘re-embody’ if I am to enjoy the world. 
So, I come ‘down’ corporeally, materially, into the contents of my life. If love of life is 
happiness, then the contents of life become all important to me. “Contents…are not my 
being but more dear to me than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, 
warming oneself in the sun” (TI:112). Even those needs that are not about my subsist-
ence in being are all important to me as a lover of life. For the duration of my life, by 
the temporality of my happiness, the contents of my life that I love become the point of 
my life.
The second is a relationship built on terror. with temporality, I risk suffering. In separating, 
I have gone beyond being. I have released the world, and its ‘otherness’ now attaches 
the things that I need to its nothingness. It attaches them, not to a fixed point that I 
could perhaps sever, but to nothing. Re-embodied (eating, thinking, warming myself 
under the sun) I must absorb myself in the elemental if I am to enjoy myself. And with 
every moment of anxiety I feel at this prospect, I anticipate the il y a.
In my elevation, I set myself up for the enjoyment of the world but also for the terror 
of the il y a. with the potential of my elevation to expose me to such suffering, I ask again 
why does Levinas make elevation a prerequisite for the ethical encounter?
For Levinas, the ‘absence’ that (hu)man elevation creates in the world—an absence 
that is taken up in the present by the il y a—devalues the existence of the rest of the world 
subordinating it to (hu)man need. And by describing the il y a as horrific, so too the 
nonhuman world is found to be inherently horrific. So with one upward stroke, Levinas 
negotiates a departure for (hu)mans from the rest of the world. while (hu)mans are set 
on a movement upwards, the rest of the non(hu)man world finds itself locked into a posi-
tion that allows for little movement. For now, the nonhuman world is held tight by two 
opposing forces. From above, this world removed of (hu)mans is weighed down by the 
neediness of (hu)mans. And from beneath, the world is tied firmly in place by the heavy 
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grip of nothingness. while (hu)mans have made a somewhat dubious escape, Levinas 
sees no such future for the rest of the nonhuman world. The future of the world is dic-
tated by an existence that I am beyond. The things that I need from the world are suspen-
sions of the il y a. They do not elevate their own existence as I do mine. My elevation 
makes my future distinct from the future of things: their future leads nowhere.
Things that arise from the il y a can never rise to my elevation, because the il y a sits 
at the opposite end of the spectrum from my elevated position. In fact, it is my elevation 
that brings the world into form. If it were not for the height of my elevation (the light of 
my bonne conscience), then these things would have remained a part of the elemental form-
lessness of the world. Levinas can describe things as giving of themselves to my needs 
because it was my needs that gave them their form. Thus, the elevated position that 
Levinas ascribes to (hu)mans allows me to feel at ease about using the world. But eleva-
tion does not alleviate the possibility of suffering: it gives me the right to try my hardest 
at happiness by using the world. And because the nonhuman world is unconscious to 
happiness, it cannot—according to Levinas—suffer from my use or consumption of it. 
This is the most important consequence of Levinas’s positioning of (hu)mans in an el-
evated relation to the rest of the world.
Levinas’s notion of (hu)man elevation is also crucial to an understanding of how 
Levinas’s ethics manages to avoid the alterity of the (hu)man world. The spatial mani-
festations of avoidance will be considered in later works, but for now, I continue to chart 
Levinas’s dystopic path of the (hu)man subject toward the face of the (hu)man other. 
For, as it stands, I, as that elevated (hu)man subject, am not yet capable of the ethical 
encounter. Before I can proceed on my ethical journey, I must first find some security 
against the force of the il y a, a force that my elevation has released against my future. 
Instead of giving in to the recklessness of the il y a, I must find a way to resist the il y a. 
This ‘resistance’ is what Levinas deems to be the precursor to ethics—not a surrender 
to the immediacy of enjoyment that brings me up against the terror of the il y a, but an 
enjoyment that suspends itself, and, in being suspended, acts as security for me against 
the il y a. For Levinas, eating does not bring up immediately the terror of the il y a. But 
why, then, does eating bring up immediately the terror of the il y a in me?
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